Debt, debt relief, and growth : a bargaining approach by Cohen, Daniel & Verdier, Thierry
Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs
WORKING  PAPEES
Debt  and  International  Finance
International  Economics  Department









Accumulation of reserves and debt-equity swaps can help a
debtor country alleviate the distortionary burden of taxing its
citizens.  But caveats and qualifications apply.
ThePolicy, Research, and Extemal Affairs Complex dcstributes  PRE Working Papers to disseminate the ftndings of work in progress and
to eneourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in development issues. These papers carTy  the names of
the authors. reflect only their views, and should be uscd and cited accordingly. The findings. interpretations, and conclusions arc the

















































































































Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs|
Debt  and International  Finance
WPS 762
This  paper  -a  product  of  the Debt  and  International Finance  Division,  Intemational  Economics
Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to understand the impact of debt reduction on developing
countries.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Please contact Sheilah King-Watson, room S8-040, extcnsion 31047 (27 pages).
Debtor countries in the 1980s paid creditors with  want to reduce the vulnerability of the debtor to
taxes the governments had to levy on their  their sanctions (that is, required taxation).  In the
citizens.  Because taxes must be collected in a  other, the debtor would actually prefer less
distortionary way, however, governments are  growth than more.
tempted to "up-front" the adjustment effort.
Doing so helps relieve investment and growth of  The role of reserves.  Use of reserves can
the burden of expected future taxation.  improve a country's  welfare, over the case of the
rescheduling agreement.  The country must,
Governments have two ways of up-fronting:  however, be able to commit itself to a tax rate
accumulating reserves and engaging in an equity  before negotiations start.  Otherwise, reserves are
swap.  Cohen and Verdier compare these meth-  useless.
ods with a constant rescheduling agreement.  In
the rescheduling agreement, it is assumed that no  Debt-equity swaps.  The outcome always
reserves can be accumulated and that all tax  Pareto-dominates the outcome of the reschedul-
collections go to the creditors.  Their findings:  ing equilibrium.  Banks always gain a fraction of
the country's  capital above the share of output
Rescheduling agreement.  A "memoryless"  that they gain in the rescheduling equilibrium.
(past-independent) rescheduling game was  Thus banks are relatively less "impatient" than
studied.  It is Pareto-inefficient.  Two Laffer  the country to reach a debt-relief agreement.
curves can take place.  In one, the lenders would
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The  net  transfers  that  the  government  of  the  indebted  LDCs  were
asked  to  make  to  their  creditors  in  the  1980's  had  to  be  taxed  (one  way
or  another)  on  their  residents.  Taxes  are  bad,  because  they  must  be
collectea  in  a  distortionary  way,  and  this  explains  why  governments  are
usually  tempted  to  up-front  the  adjustment  effort  that  they  must
undertake  so  as  to  relieve  (as  much  as  possible)  investment  and  growth
from  the  burden  of  expected  future  taxation.  (Surprise  hyperinflation  is
often  a  favorite  candidate  for  such  manipulation  of  the  time  pattern  of
taxes).
Upfronting  the  burden  of  the  adjustment,  however,  is  only  good  if
the  debtor  country  can  make  sure  that  it  can  trade  more  payments  to-day
against  less  in  the  future.  Assume  however  that  the  debt  which  the
country  owes  is  infinite  (in  face  value  terms).  The  trade-off  between
current  and  later  payments  can  only  be  achieved  through  one  of  the  two
following  channels:  1)  the  accumulation  of  reserves  by  the  country  which
may  help  it  separate  the  decision  to  tax  the  economy  from  the  decision
to  service  the  debt  of  assuming,  obviously,  that  the  reserves  cannot  be
seized).  2)  a  comprehensive  debt  relief  agreement  which  upfronts  the
burden  of  the  adjustment  (In  the  paper  we  analyze  the  outcome  of  a
massive  debt  equity  swap).  It  is  the  comparison  of  each  of  these
channels  to  a  constant  rescheduling  agreement  which  forms  the  core  of
the  paper.
The  analysis  in  this  paper  draws  on  the  sequential  bargaining
approach  to  negotiation  pioneered  by  Rubinstein  (1982)  and  already
applied  to  the  LDC debt  problem  by  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989),  Fernandez
and  Rosenthal  (1990)  and  O'Connell  (1988) among  others.  This  approach  is
merged  with  the  (endogeneous)  growth  model  of  debt  repudiation  of  Cohen
and  Sachs  (1986)  and  with  the  "tax  model"  of  debt  of  Helpman  (1988a  and
1988b).  Contrarily  to  the  model  of  debt  rescheduling  of  Bulow  and
Rogoff,  the  rescheduling  equilibrium  that  we  obtain  is  typically
Pareto-inefficient  because  of  the  bad  timing  of  taxation  which  it
induces.  Our  model  will  exhibit  -in  addition  to  this  basic  inefficiency-
two  potential  Laffer  curves  effects.  One  is  the  usual  disincentive
1effect  of  taxation  that  may  be  counterproductive  to  both  the  lenders
and  the  debtor.  Another  one  is  a  case  of  immiserizing  growth  that  is
detrimental  to  the  debtor  only.  To  the  extent  (as  we  shall  prove)  that
the  bargaining  power  of  the  debtor  is  reduced  by  a  faster  growth  rate,
we  shall  see  that  it  may  indeed  happen  that  a  good  news  for  growth  (say
a  better  productivity  of  capital)  turns  out  to  be  a  bad  news  for  the
debtor's  welfare  (and  a  good  news  for  the  creditors  only).
Assuming  away  these  two  Laffer  curves  effect,  we  shall  proceed  to
investigate  how  the  Pareto-inefficiency  of  the  bargaining  equilibrium
could  be  removed.
We  first  investigate  whether  the  debtor  can  raise  its  welfare  by
accumulating  reserves  (assumed  now  to  be  non  seizable  by  the  creditors)
which  may  help  It  separate  (and  redesign  optimally)  the  decision  to  tax
their  domestic  economy  and  pay  their  creditors.  We  shall  see
thataccumulating  reserves  may  help  the  country  raise  its  bargaining
stance  against  the  creditors  but  only  if  it  can  commit  Itself  to  a  tax
schedule  before  .he  negotiation  starts.
We  then  examine  the  welfare  implications  of  a  comprehensive
debt-equity  swap.  While  always  Pareto-improving,  we  show  that  the
deal  always  turns  out  to  be  relatively  more  to  the  advantage  of  the
banks  than  to  the  advantage  of  the  country.  The  intuition  Is  simply  the
following.  As  long  as  no  deal  is  struck,  the  country  must  Invest  alone
(albeit  inefficiently).  The  banks  are  therefore  relatively  less
impatient  than  the  country  to  negotiate  a  deal.
Section  11 sets  up  the  model.  Section  III  analyzes  the  outcome  of  a
memoriless  rescheduling  agreement.  Section  IV  investigates  the  role  of
reserves.  Section  V concludes  with  the  analysis  of  a  debt  equity  swap.
11 - FRAMEWORK OF  ANALYSIS
1  - Let  us  first  describe  the  country's  economy.  Following  Cohen
and  Sachs  (1986)  and  Cohen  (1991), we  assume  that  the  country  has  access
to  a  technology  of  production  which  can  be  characterized  as  follows.
Production  shows  a  constant  return  to  scale  technology:
(1)  Qt  a  Kt  2In  which  Kt  is  the  stock  of  installed  capital.  Kt  evolves  through  a  law
of  motion:
(2)  K  t+1 1  Kt(1-d) +It
in  which  d  is  the  depreciation  rate  and  It  is  the  flow  of  new
installments.  It  can  be obtained  through  an  installment  technology  where
(3) Jt  =I(  t
have  to  be  spent  in  order  to  get  It  new  capital.  Because  of  the  constant
return  to  scale  nature  of  the  technology  of  production  with  respect  to
the  storable  asset,  the  model  exhibits  an  endogeneous  (but  non
exploding)  growth  feature  qualitatively  similar  to  that  analyzed  in
Romer  (1986).
Investment  and  production  is  undertaken  by  a  representative  private
agent.  The  government's  resources  are  obtalned  through  taxes  on  GDP.
Call  etthe  taa  -ate  at  time  t,  government's  resources  are  given  by
(4)  Tt  =tQt
The  government's  utility  is  that  of  the  representative  agent  and  Is
assumed  to  be  a  linear  function  of  present  and  future  consumption  (we  do
not  analyze,  here,  the  effect  of  finite  intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution).  We let
(S)  UO =  E  1 Ct
0
such  utllity,  in  which  Ct=Qt-Jt-Tt  is  the  net  consumption  of  the
representative  private  agent  at  time  t.
2  - Let  us  now  describe  the  International  environment.  Throughout
all  this  paper  we  shall  assune  that  the  country  owes  an  infinite  debt  to
its  creditors  (the  banks).  The  creditors  and  the  debtor  must  negotiate
3how  much  money  the  debtor  will  be  willing  to  pay.  Let  us  assume  that  the
banks  are  only  interested  in  maximizing  the  present  discounted value  of
the  net  transfers  (Pt)  performad  by  the  debtor.  Call  V  this  value.  If
ISO  Is  the  discount factor  of  the  banks
(6)  V 0 = Z3Pt
In  section  V  we  assume  that  the  (net)  payments  by  the  debtor  and
the  government  resource  may  diverge  by  allowing  the  debtor  to  accumulate
(non-seizable)  reserves.  Here,  let  us  simply  assume  that  all  resources
collected  by  the  government  are  paid  to  the  creditors  and  let  the
negotiation  be  directly  carried  over  the  tax  rate  t  which  the
government  is  required  by  the  debtor  to  impose  on  the  private  agents;
let  Pt=9t  Qt  the  net  transfers  performed  by  the  debtor.
3  - Let  us  now  describe  the  bargaining  structure  out  of  which  the
payment  will  be  extracted  from  the  country.  We  shall  slightly  diverge
from  Rubinstein  alternative  offer  structure  and  consider  the  t'  w
following  games.  Call  G  the  games  in  which  the  banks  make  an  offer  to
the  country.  If  the  country  accepts  to  pay  whichever  transfer  P  was
asked  by  the  bank,  we  go  to  the  next  period  and  the  banks  make  another
offer.  If  the  country  refuses  the  offer  from  the  banks,  two  things
happen.  On  the  one  hand,  the  banks  can  impose  (without  a  loss  to
themselves)  sanctions  to  the  debtor.  On  the  other  hand,  the  period
after,  it  becomes  the  country's  turn  to  make  an  offer.  If  accepted,  we
move  to  the  next  stage  and  the  country  makes  another  offer;  if  refused,
sanctions  are  Imposed  on  the  country  and  it  becomes  the  banks'  turn  to
make  an  offer.  Presented  In  extensive  form,  the  game  evolves  as  follows:
4G =  Banks make  offers
If  y  /  If  no.  Sanctions  A Q  are  Imposed
G0  GI
GI  =  Country  makes  offers
If  yes  If  no.  Sanctions  A Qt  are  imposed
GI  Go0
III  - CHARACTERISATION  OF THE MEMORILESS  SUBGAME  PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
I  - In  this  section,  we  shall  restrict  our  attention  to  the  case
when  only  memoriless  (past  independent)  strategies  can  be  Implemented.
Furthermore,  we  shall  keep  the  assumption  that  no  reserves  can  be
accumulated  (say  that  they  could  entirely  be  seized  by  the  creditors)
and  that  all  tax  co-sections  by  the  government  go  to  the  creditors.
For  any  equilibrium  tax  burden  eGt imposed  on  them,  the  private
agents  choose  to  maximize  E13  11-et-y,]  Qt  In  which  Yt  is  the  share  of
0
total  investment,  Jt/Qt,  in  GDP.  When  t  is  time  invariant,  one  can  show
that  the  private  agents'  strategy  is  one  in  which  a  fixed  Investment
rate  and  a  fixed  growth  rate  is  chosen.  Call  x  =  - the  e  Investment Q
rate  associated  to  this  equilibrium,  the  growth  rate  of  the  economy  is
then  simply:
(7)  n  =  a  x  (e)  - d
5In which x(G) Is simply:
(8) x(e)  - Arg max l-9-x(ll/2  * a x)
x  1  -9  rI  +a x-dj
(In  conformity  with  Romer's  model,  growt'  is  a  positive  function  of
investment).
Let  us  call  e  and  01 the  equilibrium tax  rates  which  are  obtalned
in  each  of  the  games Go and  GV, (when the  banks or  the  country  have a
first  mover advantage). Let  n0 and  n 1 the  equilibrium growth  rates  which
they  are  asociated  to,  and  yo  and  y 1 the  corresponding gross  Investment
t/Q t).  Those parameters  form  a  system  which must  solve  the  following
equations:
1-  I_o-yo  c  -Y)  1(ln  )-  1-i;F;
(a)  001  (I  =  I--  +  I11Ii-  +
(9)
(b)  -g 0(1+n1)  I  (  no) 1-% (  0(I+n 0 )
Equation (9-a)  states  that  the  banks must make an offer  e0  which Is
acceptable  to  the  country.  (Note  that  the  investment  rate,  if  the
country  was  to  refuse  the  banks'  offer,  is  equal  to  the  investment  rate
It  would choose  in  the  game  G1).  Equation  (9-b)  states  that  the  country
must  make an  offer  which Is  acceptable  to  the  banks.  In  order  to  obtain
a  palatable  solution,  let  us  simply  assume  here  that  the  time  between
two  offers  becomes  infinitely  small.  Let  g  1+8  h  and  let  h  go
towards  zero  (do  5 8I).  In  that  case  9  and  e 1 converge  one  towards
another.  The equilibrium is  then simply characterized  as follows
6(e -n
(a) e  "x;  g
(10) (b) n  u  a  x  - d
(c)  x  Arg  Max 1-x(1+l/2  a  x)  -
x
One can  obtain  a  simple  representation  of  the  equilibrium  through
the  following diagram In growth  and payments.
n
Banks  bargaining  power
I  ,Country's  response
_~~~~~~~
FIGURE
The  downward sloping  curve  (equation  (lOb) and  (lOc)) Indicates  the
reaction  of  the  growth rate  of  the  economy to  a  tax  burden e Imposed on
the  country  by the  banks. The upward  sloping curve (equation  10-a)  shows
that  the  bargaining  power  of  the  banks  Is  an  increasing  function  of  the
growth  rate  of  the  economy (since  8,  t  80,  equation  (10-a)  shows  an
Increasing  relationship  between  0  and  n).  Appendix 1  analyzes  In  detail
7the  conditions  under  which  equations  (10)  have  a  unique  equilibrium
with  positive  growth.  Equation  (A1.3)  in  the  appendix  offers  the
relevant  condition  for  existence.  We assume  it  to  hold  in  the  sequl.
In  the  limiting  case  when  a  =a5p the  bargaining  power  cf  the  banks
is  simply  such  as  to  impose  e  =  2  . The  syster  (10)  then  becomes  a
recursive  one  and  growth  can  be  directly  calculated  out  of  (10-b)  and
(10-c)  when  is  substituted  to  9.  Otherwise,  when  a  <  8  the  share
obtained  by  the  banks  is  always  superior  to  A/2.
There  are  twro potential  "Laffer  Curves"  effects  associated  with  the
equilibrium  depicted  In  (10).  The  first  one  is  the  usual  Laffer-Curve
effect.  From  the  banks'  view  point,  all  that  matter  is  to  maximize
. When 9  is  too  large,  the  disincentive  to  grow  may  overcome
(from  the  banks  and  -a  fortiori-  from  the  debtor's  view  point)  the
benefit  arising  from  a  larger  tax  rate.  In  a  subgame  perfect
equilibrium,  however,  one  can  not  rule  out  that  this  Pare.o-inefficient
outcome  will  occur.  Indeed,  in  the  simple  case  when  80  =  the  tax  rate
is  e  =  A.  If,  say,  A =  100%, the  country  is  totally  vulnerable  to  the
sanction  imposed  by  the  banks  the  Laffer  Curve  effect  will  be  obtained
if  and  only  if  the  optimal  tax  rate  is  below  50%.  To  the  extent  that
current  taxation  is  harmless,  the  incentive  to  tax  as  much  as  possible
on  a  period-by-period  basis  explains  why  a  memoriless  subgame  perfect
equilibrium  cannot  rule  out  this  Laffer  Curve  effect.
The  second  Laffer  Curve  effect  which  can  be  obtained  in  this
equilibrium  is  a  case  of  "immiserlzing  growth"  for  the  country.  As
equation  (10-a)  shows,  in  effect,  the  fastest  the  growth  rate,  the
weaker  the  bargaining  position  of  the  country  becomes  (whenever  a  >a05 10*
The  Intuition  behind  this  result  is  simply  that  the  larger  discount
factor  of  the  country  makes  it  more  eager  to  settle  for  a  deal  when  the
benefits  of  the  d&-:  are  increased.  Now  assume  that  a  positive  shock,
say  a  permanent  reduction  of  the  installation  cost  of  capital  (the
parameter  * In  equation  (3))  was  to  occur.  The  effect  can  easily  be
shown  to  increase  the  equilibrium  growth  rate  of  the  economy  and  the
share  6  which  is  obtained  by  the  creditors.  The  impact  on  the  welfare  of
the  debtor  is  however  ambiguous  as  these  two  effects  have  an  opposite
8effect  on  the  country.  The  easiest  way  to  see  how  this  "immiserizing
growth"  effect  can  be  obtained  Is  simply  to  consider  t. e  case  when  the
growth  rate  of  the  country  Is  exugeneous  (there  are  no  Investment
decision  to  be  made,  x=O).  One  can  show  that  the  formula  (10-a)  still
apply  so  that  the  welfare  of  the  debtor  is  simply:
45 -n
i-Aa  6  2n
(111 U (n)  0 
A  a  n1
Take  the  extreme  case  when  A=l,  which  corresponds  to  an  extremely
vulnerable  country.  In  that  case,  thi  utility  of  the  country  is  simply
ao-n
U (n)  0
1  !o6 0 +81-2n ]  1 1-nM
When  51  is  large  enough,  this  function  is  a  decreasia  function  of  n,
and  the  utility  of  the  country  is  at  its  minimum  when  the  growth  rate  is
the  fastest,  8O=n.
Whether  these  Laffer  Curve  effect  are  active  or  not,  however,  is
not  key  to  our  analysis.  In  all  instances,  the  equilibrium  characterized
by  the  system  (10)  is  Pareto-inefficient.  Indeed,  a  constant  tax
structure  can  always  be  improved  upon.  Because  of  the  distortionary
nature  of  the  taxation  of  output,  there  is  always  room  for  a
Paleto-improvement  which  would  allow  to  trade  more  payments  to  the
creditors  to-day,  against  less  so  in  the  future.  The  next  section  will
explore  what  are  the  consequences  of  attempting  to  overcome  this
inefficiency.
We can  summarize  the  results  in  this  section  as  follows:
Proposition  I  :There  exists  a  unique  time-invariant  memoriless  subgame
perfect  equilibrium  to  the  bargaining  game  between  the  creditors  and  the
debtor.  It  is  Pareto-inefficient.  Two  "Laffer-Curve"  effects  can  take
place,  one  where  the  lenders  would  want  to  reduce  the  vulnerability  of
9the  debtor  to  their  sanctions,  the  other  one  where  the  debtor  would
prefer  less growth to  more.
III - THE ROLE OF RESERVES
Let  us  now  investigate  whether  the  accumulation  of  reserves  can
help  the  country  alleviate  the  distortionary  burden  of  taxation.  In
order  to  anaiyze  this  question,  we  shall  make  the  following  alteration
to  the  rules  that  we  played  in  the  rescheduling  game  of  the  preceding
section.  Rather  than  assuming  that  the  game  Go  or  GI  is  indefinitely
repeated  we  shall  simply assume  that,  once an  agreement  Is  reached  (in
the  relevant  game),  the  negociation  stops  and  the  country  routinely
transfers  at  each the  payment  Qt or  0  Q  that  were agreed  upon. Call
GI# 1-1,2, these  new games. In the  case  when there  are  no Laffer  curves,
It  is  straightforward  to  see  that  the  equilibrium  that  Is  obtained
(without  reserves)  In  the  games  Gi  is  exactly  the  same  as  in  the  game
GI'  Indeed, when they make an  offer  %.,  the  banks must  make sure  that
the  country  will  not  prefer  refusing  their  offer  and  move to  the  game
G1. fI  there  are  no  Laffer  curve,  they  will  consequently raise  eO up to
the  maximum value of  9  for  which (9-a)  is satisfied.  The same will hold
in  the game G1 so that  (9-b) will also be satisfied.
Let  us  now assume,  In addition,  that  t-.a country  can hold reserves
that  cannot  be  seized  by  the  creditors  . There  now exists  a  potential
wedge  between  the  country's  current  tax  burden  and  the  country's
payments  to  its  creditors.  Call Ft  the  net  flows  of  accumulated reserves
at  time  t  and  let  t  the  tax  burden  Imposed on  the  country.  0t  keeps
representing  the net transfers  to  the creditors.  We therefore  have
(17)  ht  Qt  - et  Qt + Ft
We assume  In the  sequel  that  reserves  pay  a  rate  of  interest  which
Is  equal  to  80,  the  creditors'  rate  of  time  preference.  In  order  to
simplify  the  analysis,  we  shall  limit  our  study  to  the  following  two
simple  games.
1) CLM  I  The country  and  the  creditor  first  negociate  the  value
a0  or  01  that  the  country  Is  required  to  pay  (stage  1 of  Game A). Once
10this  Is  done,  the  country  can  choose  (and  credibly  commit  itself  to)  a
flat  tax  rate  T  s  e  that  may  differ  from  the  value  6  that  Is  agreed
upon.  We assume  that  the  discrepancy  can  be  financed  by  a  one-shot
accumulation  of  reserves  which  -perhaps-  involves  a  negative  Initial
negative consumption.
2)  £  :  The order  of  play Is reversed  with  respect  to  the  Game
A.  First,  we  ass ume that  the  country  can  commit  Itself  to  a  flat  tax
rate  T.  Then,  the  negociation  with  the  creditors  start  as  to  how  much
payments  0Qt  the  country should make.
Anallsis  g  h  Game A
Let  us  first  analyze the  second stage  of  the  game. Assume that  the
country  Is  (already)  required  to  pay  a  f. action  f  Qt  Of  Its  output  each
period.  Will  it  then  find  it  profitable  to  accumulate  reserve  so  as  to
alleviate the  distortionary  burden of  taxes  ?
Assume that  the  country  builds  up  Initially  a  stock  of  reserve  R
which  it  uses  to  reduce  (say  uniformly)  the  tax  burden  on  the  private




(when writing  the  equations  in  continuous time)  In  which n.t  Is  the  rate
of  growth  which  is  associated  with  the  tax  rate  T.  The utility  that  the
country  can get  out of  this  accumulation of reserves  can be written  as
UR  R +  Max  - - y(n) LR  n-.  a  aI  l-n
o  - T  - 8 -y(nT)
8-n  +  n
11Since  s  o  t  ,  so  that  one  can  write 0O  1  ao-n  T  a I-n*
I  - G - y(n  )
(18) UR 5  - 1 f.  n
Now,  the  utility  that  the  country  would  obtain  by  not  accumulating
reserves  Is  simply
(19) U  = Max  1 - I  - y(n)
0  n  a1C
Inspection  of  equations  (18)  and  (19)  shows  that  UOt  UI . The
country  cannot  raise  its  welfare  by  increasing  reserves  and  reducing
taxes.  The  reason  is  that  the  potential  benefits  of  lower  taxation,  a
higher  growth  rate,  are  partially  captured  by  the  lenders.
If  one  moves  back  to  stage  I  of  game  A,  it  is  consequently  obvious
that  nothing  is  changed  with  respect  to  the  rescheduling  game  that
prevailed  without  reserves.
Analysis  of  Game  _
Let  us  now  assume  that  the  country  is  already  committed  to  a
pattern  of  taxation  r  when  it  enters  into  the  rescheduling  game  G0 or  I
with  the  banks.
Call  R(G,r)  the  amount  of  reserves  that  the  country  must  accumulate
when  a  deal  6  is  struck  with  the  creditors,  while  it  is  already
committed  to  Imposing  a  tax  rate  r  on  the  economy.  Assume that  there  is
a  small  time  interval  h  between  the  offers  that  are  made  in  the  games  Go
and  G  I  One has:
9  - T
R(.)  0  - n  (U  4  ao h)
(in  which  nT  Is  the  equilibrium  growth  rate  that  is  achieved  by  the
country  when  the  tax  rate  r  is  implemented).
12*  In  the  game  Go  (resp.  G1  )  the  banks  (resp.the  country)  can  make  an
offer  eO  (resp.  e1)  that  Is  acceptable  if
[i-TYnr  (1.5  Ih)  - R(%OO)  1-A-y(n 0 )h 
1--r-y(nT)1
(l+n 0h)  4  - n  I  5  h  R(elr)]J
O -nT  (+6  h)  =  s  (+  n 1 h)
0  0  0  n  r  nh
where  n  (1=0.1)  are  the  optimum  growth  rates  that  are  selected  by  the
country  in  the  game  Gi  when  no  deal  is  struck  in  that  game  and  when  it
expects  to  strike  a  deal  at  the  next  round.
Making use  of  the  following  equalities
0-?r
R(°T)  =  - n  (1 + d  h)  and  R(G 1,T)  n  d  (1+  60 h)
0 
and  letting  h  go  towards  zero,  one  finds  that  the  equilibrium  values
(go,  n)  are  a  solution  to
13e  81-'  [  1  r  T - y(nT)  1  -A-y(n-) 
80 -n  so8+8-2~  n-  ~  Bi  - n  1 
a1  - n-  n  +
86  i-2  n  dn  n-
I  +  . (Go + d)  T  y(n_  r) _____
This  system  yields  a  solution  9*(T)  and  a*(r).  Moreover we  should
only  consider  donrestic  tax  rates  that  satisfies  T  5  @*(x)  in  order  to
have positive reserves.
We can show (In appendix 2) that
V T  such that  0  :s  Ts 5@(Y):
U(?)-IT-(l)  - e*(r)--r  > p
a a  ;  nlr  aornT
where  UR  Is  the  utility  of  the  country  in  the  memoriless  rescheduling
equilibrium  of  section  III  and  U(T)  Is  the  level  of  welfare  that  the
country  can  get  If  It  expects  to  be  asked  to  pay  04(6)  by  the  bankers.
We therefore  see  that  in  the  game  B,  the  country  necessarily  obtains  a
higher  utility  level  than  In  the  game  of  section  III.  Hence when  the
country  has  the  ability  to  accumulate reserves  and  to  commit itself  to  a
pattern  of  tax,  then  It  can  Improve its  welfare  compared to  the  case  of
the  rescheduling game. We can summarize our results  as  follows:
ErMPoujign :  When It  can  commit  itself,  ahead  of  the  negotiation,  to
a  given tax  rate,  the  country  can  raise  its  welfare  above the  memoriless
rescheduling equilibrium. Otherwise, reserves  serve no purpose.
14IV  - DEBT RELIEF AND DEBT EQUITY SWAPS
In  thls  section,  we  now assume  that  the  banks  and  the  country  can
bargain  on  a  comprehensive debt  relief  agreement  of  the  following form.
We assume  that  the  country can  surrender  Its  sovereignty  on a  piece  HO.
If  Its  stock  of  capital  and  transfer  its  property  to  the  creditors.  In
exchange,  the  creditors  can  write-off  the  debt  that  is  due  by  the
country.
The structure  of  the  bargaining  process  is  the  same as  the  one that
we  assumed  in  section  11. In  the  game  GoP the  banks offer  to  write-off
the  country's  debt  against  a  fraction  of  the  country's  capital.  If  the
country  refuses,  It  has  a  pay  a  cost  AQO 0 and  may  make an  alternative
offer  in  the  game  G 1. If  the  creditors  then  refuse  the  country's  offer,
sanctions  are  again  imposed on  the  country  and  the  game switch  back to
G0. Whenever a  deal  Is  accepted,  the  game  Is  terminated:  the  debt  is
written-off;  the  creditors  and  the  country  each  undertake  the  investment
that  maximize the  welfare  that  they  can obtain  from  the  piece of  capital
that  they eventually own.
Call  Ho  and  H 1 the  offers  that  are  respectively  made  by  the
creditors  (In Game G0)  and  by the  debtor  (In Game G1).  Assume that  the
time  horizon  between  two  offers  is  h.  One may then  write  the  condition
of  acceptability  of the offers  Hnand  HI as  follows
(22-a)  (1+51 h)  I  ][1  Ho]=  h(l-X-y  )  + (1n0  h)[  L  ](i-H)
(22-b) HI  (1+8  . h)  a H0 Z  . (l+n  )
in  which  fi  and  y  are  respectively  the  growth  rate  and  the  investment
rate  that  the  country  chooses  In order  to  maximize its  utility  when  the
debt  Is  cancelled.  Because  of  the  homogeneity of  degree  I  of  utility
with  respect  to  the  initial  stock  of  capital,  this  decision  obviously
15does  not  depend  on  the  outcome  H  or  H 1 of  the  game.  We can  then  write
(l,Af) as  a  solution  to
l-x(1+f  Oa  x)
x =Arg  max  a  +d-a  x
x
(23) - ;  (,+.L  X)
fi=ax  - d
Similarly,  we  define  n  and  x  as  the  corresponding  choices  of  the
creditors,  when  they  maximize  the  utility  that  they  can  generate  out  of
H1K (i=1,2):
I- x(I  1+ Oa  x)
x*=  Arg  max  6  +d-a  x
(24)  y-=  x(  +  x*) 2
n"=  a  x-  - d
Finally  ni  and  yb  (i=O,1)  are  the  optimum  growth  and  investment
rates  that  are  selected  by  the  country  in  the  games  Gi  when  no  deal  is
struck  in  that  game  and  when  it  expects  to  strike  a  deal  at  the  next
round.
Substituting  H 1 for  its  value  as  a  function  of  Ho  from  equation
(22-b)  into  equation  (22-a)  and  letting  the  time  intei val  h  shrink  to
zero,  one  finds  that  the  equilibrium  value  H'  is  simply:
(25)  H  6  nb  lA-yb
W;0;  a  2n  %+  SZ-  n b  I-
We can  prove  the  following:
16Propositioq  3  The  outcome  of  the  debt-equity  swap  always
Pareto-dominates  the  outcome  of  the  rescheduling  equilibrium.  The  banks
always  gain  a  fraction  of  the  country's  capital  that  is  above  the  share
(of  output)  that  they  gain  in  the  rescheduling  equilibrium.
The  fact  the  debt-equity  swap  Pareto-dominates  the  rescheduling
equilibrium  is  not  much  of  a  surprise:  by  writing  down  the  debt,  the
banks  avoid  imposing  on  the  country  an  inefficient  taxation  of  output.
What  is  more  of  interest  is  the  comparison  of  the  debt-equity  swap
outcome  with  the  rescheduling  equilibrium.  When  60=6 i.  one  can  see
directly  from  equation  (25)  that  H  >  A  the  banks  gain  a  larger
fraction  than  in  the  rescheduling  game.  This  hierarchy  is  shown  (in
appendix  2)  to  be  always  valid.  This  result  may  be  interpreted  as
showing  that  the  banks  are  relatively  less  "impatient"  than  the  country
to  reach  a  debt  relief  agreement.  The  intuition  behind  this  result  is
simply  the  following.  If  the  country  refuses  the  banks'  offer  in  game  Go
(or  if  the  banks  refuse  its  offer  in  the  game  G1).  then  the  country  has
to  undertake  an  investment  Yb  that  will  be  partially  ripped-off  by  the
banks  in  the  next  round,  if  an  offer  is  accepted.  (The  country  cannot
discriminate  between  the  investment  that  will  raise  its  own  post-deal
capital  from  that  which  will  go  to  the  banks).  This  explains  why  the
banks  are  "relatively"  less  impatient  to  reach  a  deal  than  is  the
country:  as  long  as  no  deal  is  reached,  the  cost  of  investment  is
(albeit  inefficiently)  carried  by  the  country  alone.
17APPENDIX 1:  EXISTENCE  AND UNIQUENESS  OF THE
STATIONARY  SUBGAME  PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
The  two  equations  caracterizing  the  equilibrium  in  equations  (10)
are
l-0-x(l  e  x
I  + l  ax  =  a  l  ed-ax  IAl.1)
a1ed-ax
e  a+e2+2d-2ax  (Al.2)
Equation  (Al.l)  defines  a  curve  x(e)  (or  n(G)) and  equation  (Al.2)
defines  a  curve  6(x)  (or  e(n)).  It  is  easy  to  characterize  the  curve
x(G).  It  Is  given  by:
(1+0 ax)(81 +  d  - ax)  +  ax  (1 +  0  ax  °  a  (1-0)
that  is
- 0  + ax  0(0  +d) - la(I-0)  - (6  1 d)]  0. 2
Oed  Iled The  relevant  solution  must  satisfy:  0  S  x  s  _a  d  -< --  (in  order
to  have a  finite  wealth for  the country).  Hence
x  X  [  l(81+d) - (S1ed)  1  - (5i.  1  )2 I
and  the  following  conditions  on  the  parameters  must  hold
(A1.3)  2  la  - (8+d)Ic <  [(8  +  d)  2_(61  r)  ]1
1  ~~~18ao+d  21a(I-O)  (a  .d)i
(in  order  to  have x i  - and  -2) a  *  (8.+d)
It  is easy  also to  see  that  there  exists  Aand  8such  that
x(QA)  (  and  x  (68)  Q
One can write
[  a  ]  Ur  2(2d)  _ 1  I  and sB  '  1 a
. Hence taor S  c  (OGA). the  growth  rate  In  the  economy will  be
positive
*  and  for  e  (a AO  1)  the  growth  rate  in  the  economy will  be
negative and aways higher than  -d.  (For B c  (0* 1)  It  Is equal to  -d).
Moreover:  n  (0)  a  ax(O)  - d  < r
and  dn . a dx  a  (8+d
a0  - Wd  ax)  *  <  0
Now equation  (41.2)  defines  a  curve  6(n)  which  Is  Increasing  In  n
for ne [lo  . Indeed, ai; a  2; A >  - Vn  80  o-
Moreover we have that  Vn £  1-d.n(lO):  G(n) c  [O.A1  and V 0  c  (O,A1.
n(S) c  [-d,n(O)1
hence:  the  function p :  [-d,n(0)  -> R
n  --  n(O(n)l
Is  a  continuous  function  from  l-d,n(0)j  into  1-d.n(O)I.There  Is
consequently  a  fixed  point  n  such  that  V(n) a  n.  Moreover since  p(n)m
dn  dO  °  and  4p is  strictly  decreasing  over  1-d.n(O)I one  sees  that  the
19fixed  point  is  unlique. We have  therefore  shown  that  and  the  subgame
stattonayi  equilibrium  exists  and is  uniaue  and  a  solutiOn  to
E  ,  @  5  o~~.9  (n)
n  ArgmaaX  -n-
QED
Nlotes:
. i  A  then n  is negative with-  d  s n  s 0  and
8i
and  e  +| ; 
. if  eA  P.  A then n  is  positive and 6e  |  +  i
20APPENDIX  2  - PROOF OF PROPOSITION  2
The acceptability  conditions  can  be  written  as  follows
O'  61-nX  1  - T  - y(n)  1y(n)
ao nl  0o+41-  2 n  [  L  - n  - "1
(A2.1)
a0+e  -2n  6  n
1  - - (n T
1  (i+  +  d)  =  y-(nr)  n  t  (A2.2)
I T  0  T
From  (A2.2),  we  conclude  that  for  'r  s  e*(T),  one  has  that
no  s  n
T  - y(nT  eT
Moreover  :  U(T)  =  T  - and
IT  0 
1-  T  - Y (nT )  *-T  60  [  T  Y(nT  T
0~~~~~~~~~  -ln  T  a  +n  6042  n  -n  ^1~nT 1-n  6  - A  TI
-n*  I  y(n~")
6  +*1-2n  62  n
21Thus, since  80s  8a and  c  t  0,  we have
ao-no  I,  yf  yXn)  ai  A1n  r  y(ne) 
U(t)  8-.. ..  _... a +a -2  a-  ^  nY  80  +a  2  no  a  -n
1-A  1  _  - n)
8  -n'  '1  y(nr)  1  *o+1  2 n
r 1-  ~  0 
8e8  ;  1  ynTs  +8  -2ne It  . . ,,  .I  +
a1  +0-2  na_  1  a1  n
*  -n  I  - n)
,  o0+df 2 n  J  1 -ne
I  U(s)  t  °  ~~~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r  I -y(nT)  1 -y( - 1+
61  i-2~  n  ~  fl  41t81  - n 
1-A  1-  (n 
ao a1-2 n
8  - n
Thus.  s§c.  nT1 S  na,we  also  have that:
8  - n- 1 - I  I  - y(n)




Using  tA2.2)  and  the  fact  that  the  equilibrium  growth  rate  nR
obtained  In section  III Is  such  that:
1-  A  - 7(nR)
l  +¢tn  4d)  o  xIUn  R
0 aI6 1 2 n
I  o(n  +d)  -U
we can conclude that
n- a n  R
and also  that
U(tr1  - I  OlGO  +  d) a  I  +  ffnR  +  d)-  UR
Thus U(r)  a  UR . Q.E.D
23APPENDIX  3  - POOF OF PROPOSITION  3
Let  us  prove  that  the  debt-equity  swap  Pareto-dominates  the
rescheduling  agreement.
Let  us  first  analyze  the  country's  welfare.  From  the  definition  cf
H'  in equation  (  ), one  can  write  the  country's  welfare  as
1- y  I  y  I  - Ab- y
(A2.1) U  =  (i-H*)  R  (-  11-(nb)  +  -a  n  e(n  )
a1  1  i  a  f 
in  which
8  -n  6  n  -n
(A2.2)  I-G(n)  a+;  (n)  =  3  61-2n
and  nb  Is  the  solution  to:
{b  b  Yb  2  xb)  ;rb  b )
(A2.3)  _
1 b-  h  b
1 +  xb  =  (1  8 b)  al-nb
In the  particular  case  when  a 0  81* one  sees  that  e  5  1/2.
From  (A2.3)  one  sees  first  that:  xA  Xb  S  x  (xb  =  h  is  obtained
when  n  b  =  0  ; xb  x  is  obtained  when  itb  1). One can  also  write
I  lbI-  (A2-4)  I  x  - [_  _  b ]Yb+  >',2b_
24To  the  extent  that  the  f irst  term  in  bracket  in  the  right-hand
side  Is  necessarily  positives  and  since  the  solution  to  the  equation
I  - y  - A 9(n)
(A2.5)  I . x  =  n
is  nothing  else  but  the  solution  to  the  rescheduling  equilibrium.  one
sees  that  xb  >  x  (x  the  rescheduling  solution)  and  that  the  level  of
welfare  reached  by  the  country  (which  is  nothing  else  but  the  right-hand
side  in  equation  (A2.4))  is  above  the  rescheduling  level  (which  is  the
right-hand  side  of  equation  A2.5).
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  banks'  pay-off.
One can  write
1  'Yb  Si  F  ___ 
H=bL  1 i5-nb  l_  ]  [e~  1'  A  In
l _b  - 1-j  Sn
Since  the  f irst  term  In  bracket  is  positive  (and  because  A  s  1)  one
can  write
HN  A  6b  {I  +  6  }
So that
H'  a  A  b
Since  nb  a  no,  this  shows  that  H  : A  o  :  the  banks  gain  a  larger
fraction  of  the  country's  capital  stock  than  the  share  6  that  they
obtained  In  the  recheduling  game.  This  proves  the  second  part  of
proposition  3.
In  order  to  show  that  this  does  improve  their  pay-off  one  has  to
see  that
25I  8:-t0  (since  fS > nb.  and  8,  t  ao)
Si  ab  Ob 
so that
H  t  , eb  [I  I  _  * g;b  * Yb]
This  shows that  the  pay-off  of the  banks which Is
(AZ.  6)  V- a  He  1 - [  A  eb  0i-y  0I
is certainly  above the rescheduling level
A 00
Indeed this  latter  payment  can be written
(A2.7) VYn  0 (1-Y_  +  AaA;0  Y
(A2.7)  V0 o-  0  0  0no
and  the  first  and  the  second  term  In  equation  (A2.6)  respectively
dominate the  corresponding terms  In equation (A2.7).
Q.E.D
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